> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://0xcaptain.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# AgentBank security model and on-chain safeguards

> AgentBank uses layered security: TEE attestation, circuit breakers, agent slashing, commit-reveal signals, anti-sybil guards, and invariant-tested contracts.

AgentBank uses multiple independent security layers to protect user funds and maintain protocol integrity.

## Verifiable AI execution

Every agent decision is cryptographically verifiable:

1. LLM runs inside an Intel SGX enclave (Phala Cloud or Marlin Oyster)
2. The TEE produces a hardware-signed attestation quote
3. `TEEAttestationVerifier` (`0x51E52dCBD0FBfaDaDB43ad1EB1Ea0d3A79f128c3`) verifies the quote on-chain
4. `LLMReasoningRegistry` stores a hash chain of all reasoning steps

For high-value operations, dual-TEE attestation is required from both Phala and Marlin.

## Circuit breaker

The `CircuitBreaker` auto-pauses the protocol when thresholds are breached:

* TVL drop exceeding the configured drawdown limit
* Oracle price deviation beyond safe bounds
* Anomalous block activity

Pause levels: vault-level (2-of-3 guardian multisig), intent-level, and protocol-level (67% veABNK supermajority).

## Agent slashing and insurance

Analysts stake MNT at registration. Slashing occurs when signal accuracy falls below 40% over 4 epochs:

* Slashed MNT flows to the `InsurancePool`
* The `InsurancePool` reimburses user losses from agent failures

## Commit-reveal signals

`CommitRevealSignal` (`0x2A7D252D0bFF31eC1098FF642C0934b7124a5A33`) enforces a 5-block delay between signal commitment and reveal (\~1 minute on Mantle), preventing analysts from front-running their own signals.

## Anti-sybil

`AntiSybilGuard` (`0x2fc6e0987bF58F5A0Dc76801A9556Ab62bD42049`) requires World ID or Gitcoin Passport verification for analyst registration, preventing reputation farming through fake identities.

## Timelock

All governance parameter changes go through `AgentBankTimelock` with a **48-hour delay**, giving users time to review changes and exit before they take effect.

## Contract immutability

* `ABNKToken` and `VotingEscrow` are immutable — they cannot be upgraded
* Upgradeable contracts use UUPS proxy with a governance vote + 7-day timelock
* Peripheral contracts (strategies, adapters) are swappable via registry

## Testing

Contracts are covered by Hardhat unit/integration tests, Foundry invariant tests (1,000+ runs), Foundry fuzz tests, and Mantle mainnet fork tests.


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